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Abstract 
 
 Will aid given to specific sector promote growth? Will bilateral aid be more effective than 
multilateral aid in export promotion? This paper fills a gap in the literature by studying the 
implications of aid channeled specifically to trade and export oriented growth. Many African 
Countries look towards increase in trade driven growth as a means of improving living standards 
and boosting growth of their economies. Aid given to trade in desperately poor countries can be 
of tremendous advantage to such countries. We investigate some peculiar components of 
temporal self limiting aid (often referred to as development assistance) to sectors that can affect 
trade in developing countries. Aid to four sectors was found to have significant impact on trade 
although the presence of natural resources tends to reduce the effectiveness of aid in promoting 
trade. Institutions and government economic policies were also found to be weak in the African 
countries in our sample reducing aid overall effect on trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Foreign Aid, Government Economic Policy, Institutional Quality, Trade 
JEL:  F13, F16, O24. 
 
2 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The International Trade Centre (ITC) taskforce report 2010/13 states that global markets and 
export oriented growth are an effective way of alleviating poverty, improving livelihood and 
supporting entrepreneurship in a sustainable way.  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
Gap taskforce report 2010 have also confirmed that “trade is a useful mechanism to realize the 
MDGs by the 2015 deadline” therefore trade is vital in driving growth. Studying aid-trade 
dynamics in this paper1  provides an insight into the possible effects that aid can have on trade 
with particular emphasis on Africa.   
            Exports (as a measure of trade) can have a strong effect on the living conditions of people 
in advanced countries where strong trading capabilities have already been attained and in 
developing countries that are emerging from economic and political disruptions who wish to 
establish strong trade ties (see ITC Trade Report 2010/2013 and DFID (Department for 
international Development) Strategy Report Working Paper on Economic Growth 2008/2013). 
Exports also has the capability to increase employment, improve earning power, raise 
government revenue to provide more services to its population, provide economic empowerment 
for the poor through commerce and deal with environmental and climatic problems, if the gains 
accruing from exports are used for common good (see International Trade Centre (ITC) 
Taskforce Report 2010/13 for details).   
           Africa’s per capita GDP is also significantly low and that is why it remains the World 
poorest continent (see World Bank Statistics 2012). The African economy requires a strong 
industrial effort to drive it out of its current economic doldrums. The richest countries in Africa 
based on World Bank 2009 statistics are South Africa and Egypt, (measured by their purchasing 
power parity) with South Africa’s GDP being around $488.6 billion as of 2009, see Economic 
Watch “An African Economy Overview” (2010), however many African countries remain 
extremely poor. Foreign aid given to these poor countries can have strong effects on the 
economy of these countries (particularly in sub Saharan Africa), especially in circumstances 
where it consist of a significant percentage of their national budget or gross domestic product. If 
the reason behind giving foreign aid is purely altruistic, then foreign aid can have a positive 
impact on the recipient country’s development, if well utilized.  
            The aims of this study is to identify what components of foreign aid (channeled to trade) 
is useful in promoting productivity and increasing trade in developing countries by dividing aid 
into sectors, and secondly to determine what the impact of government economic policy and 
institutional quality is on aid effectiveness in Africa?  Previous papers have estimated reduced 
forms equations of trade aid dynamics they find that country specific economic and social 
variations and its proximity or distance to both local and foreign markets have a significant effect 
on trade (particularly exports)” see Morrissey, Osei and Lloyd (2004).  In this paper it is assumed 
that aid is endogenous. The reason for this is that aid is likely to suffer from measurement 
                                                             
1  I wish to express my thanks to Bergamo University Italy for funding the course of this research and for the guidance 
and feedback obtained in writing this paper. 
 
3 
 
problems since the data for aid might not capture all aid flows to developing countries for 
instance.  
            The econometric approach we use in the study is instrumental variable estimation, this 
allows us to control for endogenity. Aid to sectors was found to have little or no significant effect 
on trade using OLS, and it has a somewhat increased effect in sectors using two stage least 
squares.  Lots of literatures have argued that aid is useful, while others have suggested that 
giving aid does not help developing countries achieve economic growth. Some papers e.g. that of 
Jempa (1991)2 examine vast literature on foreign aid and finds that foreign aid has the tendency 
to overshadow private savings, contribute to consumption spending and has no significant impact 
on a country’s growth. Others like Boone (1994, 1996) find out that aid has no effect on 
investment.  
          Burnside and Dollar (1997) also find that aid is only beneficial to countries that have good 
policies in place. Other authors have found some similar inconclusive results regarding aid and 
growth (see Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2008; Douclouliagos and Paldam, 2007).  There is also, 
conflicting evidence that aid may have a positive impact on growth (Gormanee et al, 2003; 
McPherson and Rakowski, 2001). In addition to endogeneity, Svensson (2000) finds that 
disaggregating aid into sectors is a more promising route in trying to identify the effects that aid 
can have on a developing country. Clemens et al (2004) uses sectoral aid and finds a positive 
short-run effect on economic growth and that institutional factors may impact the effectiveness 
of aid.  See Renzio (2006) or Jensen (2008) for a review of aid literature. The rest of this paper is 
divided into five parts, the theoretical part, data description, some constraints to trade in Africa 
and index construction, empirical analysis and conclusion. 
2.0 Theory and Methodology 
The theoretical model we present suggest that  some specifically channeled aid can influence 
exports, the simple export demand model as developed by Fontagne et al (2002)3, used by 
Morrissey et al (2004) and Cali and Velde (2009), shows the possible effect that aid can have on 
trade. If we assume a situation where each country produces one good, differentiated from the 
others as a result of its place of production (origin), with the supply of each good constant and 
consumers having identical and homothetic choices which is represented by a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) utility function. The overall utility function of individuals in a given 
country k can be defined as a sum of the utility function of individuals in country i. we represent 
this in equation 1 below as  (૚. )          ࢁ࢑ = (∑    ࣐࢏  ૚࣌ ࡺ࢏ୀ૚ ࡯࢏࢑  ࣌ష૚࣌       ) ࣌࣌ష૚       
Where ߪ = elasticity of substitution of all goods and services, this can be defined as the share of 
goods and services from country i expended upon by individuals in country k, 
                                                             
2  Jempa, C. (1991) suggests that foreign aid in most cases does not contribute in a significant manner to a country’s 
economic growth. 
3  The model first developed by Fontague et al (2002) describes the role of country specific effect particularly infrastructure in 
determining trade cost. We extend this model to the private sector and show how aid will affect factors of production  such as cost of capital, 
labor and cost of developing a suitable environment for trade. 
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 C௜௞  = the value of consumption of the goods produced in country i by individuals in country k, 
φ௜ = share of goods produced by country i, expended on by individuals in country k,  
where k ϵ [1, N] this subject to the budget constraint that the value of goods and services 
consumed by individuals in country k, needs to be equal to the total national income of country 
k. The income of country K is given as shown in equation 2 below as (૛. )                ࢟࢑ = ∑   ࡯࢏࢑ ࡼ࢏࢑  ࡺ࢏ୀ૚   
 Where  P௜௞  =is the price in importer country k of goods produced in exporting country i     P௜  is expressed as the supply price of the exporter i 
 Then therefore P୧୩ =P୧ τ୧୩ where τ୧୩ ≥ 1 which is the exporters price times the cost of transaction 
This will capture all types of trade related transaction cost for example potential tariffs and 
import taxes, likely administrative cost of trade, , transportation to ports and other local and 
international market destinations etc see Cali and Velde (2009) for further discussion.  After 
maximizing eqn.1 subject to the budget constraint in eqn. 2 the real consumption  C୧୩  with 
respect to import of goods from country i by country k is given below as in equation 3 below 
  (૜. )                  ۱ܑܓ = ࣐࢏ ࢅ࢏  ࣎࢏ ࡼ࢏ (࣐࢏ ࢅ࢏  ࣎࢏ ࡼ࢏  ) ૚ି࣌  
The constant elasticity of substitution can be expressed as the likely trade cost in exporting to 
country k this can be defined as an index of how far in terms of distance, that country k is to 
country i, given by the distance factor. The distance factor can be defined as how remote goods 
from country i are from the market of country k. We express it in terms of remoteness in eqn. 4  
     (૝. )              ܀࢏ =(∑    ૎࢏  ૌ࢏  ૚ି࣌   ۾࢏  ૚ି࣌ ࡺ࢏ୀ૚ ) ૚૚ష࣌  
country’s k income can be expressed as  y௞ = P௞ Q௞ . which is the price multiplied by quantity 
consumed. The total export from country i to country k can be given as 
   X௜௞  expressed below in 
terms of the exporting price and the total consumption in k of country i goods and services. 
 (5.)   
               ܆࢏࢑ =  ۱࢏࢑ ۾࢏  = ૎࢏ ܇࢏     ૌ࢏࢑  ࣌ (܀ ۾࢏  ) ࣌ି૚  
The total exports from country i can also be expressed as  (૟. )                  ܆࢏ = ૎࢏     ܘ࢏  ࣌ష૚∑    ܇࢏    ܀࢑  ࣌ష૚   ૌ࢏࢑  ࣌  ࡺ࢑ୀ૚   
 This indicates that exports from country i will depend significantly on individual country 
preferences for goods from i. This will depict how competitive, attractive and the degree to 
which goods from country i are in demand in the international market. Total demand from 
country i therefore, will be affected in a negative manner by the cost of carrying out trade 
transaction in i, since this will affect its final selling price. This will therefore be displayed by its 
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constant elasticity of substitution σ (CES).  If the  σ =1 this will mean that the CES is high 
therefore increases in price of goods from country i will lead to a significant decrease in exports 
since buyers will have to look elsewhere for cheaper goods, therefore change in exports with 
respect to price will reduce which we can express as பଡ଼೔    ப୮೔  < 0. 
            Incorporating foreign aid into our exports model, it is likely that it could influence a 
whole lot of factors that could lead to increase in exports. Some factors that it could influence are 
the quality of goods produced by a country which could lead to product competitiveness in the 
international market this will likely increase the country’s share of trade  φ௜  .  Secondly it could 
reduce transaction cost in carrying out trade since aid is likely to improve infrastructure this will 
make the final price of country i products to be cheaper. Finally it might also reduce 
administrative and legal cost since aid might strengthen both financial and civil institutions so as 
to increase access to capital and reduce the bureaucracy of obtaining business permits and 
processing exports at ports. We define all these as transaction cost τ௜௞   and express it below in 
equation 7 as  
 (7.)                  ૌ࢏࢑ = (1+ܜ࢏࢑ ) ܊࢏ ܊࢑  ܎ (۷࢏ ۷࢑ )܌࢏࢑    
Where τ௜௞  is the transaction cost of carrying out trade in i relative to exporting to k. We express b௜ and b௞  as the cost of processing exports in country i and k respectively. We assume that 
transaction cost is a linear function of distance between i and k therefore country specific 
infrastructure should exert a positive effect on transaction cost depending on its state. The factor d௜௞  is the trade distance between i and k and therefore a barrier that should be overcome for 
trade to take place this could also affect price significantly,  I௜ and I௞ are the quality of 
infrastructure in country i and k. This shows that aid given towards improving trade capacity is 
likely to facilitate trade in a positive manner by reducing transaction cost of trade in general. 
With this we establish that there might indeed exist, a relationship between trade and aid. This 
relationship can be expressed as the inverse function between trade transaction cost and 
infrastructure. We can express trade transaction cost to reflect this by writing it as shown in 
equation 8. Where Iௗ  is each country’s domestic infrastructure and  Aସூேிோ  is aid channeled 
towards infrastructure. 
 (8.)                          ૌ࢏࢑ = (૚ାܜ࢏࢑ ) ܊࢏   (ۯ૝ࢀ )  ܊࢑ ܌࢏࢑  (ۯ૝ࡵࡺࡲࡾ  ା۷ࡰ  )࢏   ା۷࢑    
Putting equation 8 into 6 the export becomes (ૢ. )                          ܆࢏ =  (૎࢏ (ۯ૝ࡼ࡯))   (ۯ૝ࡵࡺࡲࡾ  ା۷ࡰ  )࢏  ࣌         ۾࢏  ࣌ష૚   ( ܊࢏   (ۯ૝ࢀ ) ) ࣌ ∑   ࡺ࢐ୀ૚     ܇࢏    ܀࢑  ࣌ష૚   ۳࢏࢑  ࣌   
Where E௜௞  represents the total cost of trade (in exports) by country i with all other countries. It is 
assumed therefore that different types of aid depending on the sector it is allocated to will likely 
have a positive effect on exports. Therefore we express a change in exports with respect to trade 
as shown in equation 10 below by including different constraints to trade. 
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(10.)                       ૒܆࢏    ૒(ۯ૝ࢀ)࢏ = ૒܆࢏    ૒ ܊࢑   ૒܊࢏    ૒(ۯ૝ࢀ)࢏   > 0  
 A change in exports with respect to aid will depend on how aid given to boost trade will reduce 
cost of production within a given country (see Cali and Velde (2009) for further discussion on 
how aid can influence export oriented growth).  
             Relating this to the private sector, the approach of our model will depict how aid will 
affect trade within a country, which will be a straightforward profit-maximization problem where 
trade within a country leads to a situation where firms in the private sector are attempting to 
maximize their profits (ߨ௜ ).  We can express profits ( ߨ௜) as the difference between total revenue 
and total cost ߨ௜ = ܴܶ௜ − ܶܥ௜. In constructing the total revenue function we will for simplicity 
assume that firms' quantity choice does not impact the output price.  This will be particularly true 
for firms in the export sector as they will be selling at the world price.  The total revenue 
function for firms operating in sector i can thus be written as the price of output from sector i (Pi) 
multiplied by the output level (Xi), ܴܶ௜ = ௜ܲ ௜ܺ.  So, the marginal revenue is equal to the 
price ܯܴ௜ = ௜ܲ.   In sectors of an economy firm costs are a function of several factors.   These 
include the cost of labor (w), the cost of capital (v), transportation costs (t), and rent seeking (r) . 
The cost of labor is the wage rate per unit of output produced. The cost of capital can be viewed 
as the typical rental price of capital but also more broadly as to include additional factors 
impacting the cost of obtaining capital such as access to credit.  Transportation costs are a 
function of both the distance to market and more importantly the level of infrastructure.  For 
example, in many developing countries the distance in kilometers to market is considerably less 
important than the state of the roads that lead there.  Rent seeking represents the cost of dealing 
with corrupt government officials imposed on firms.  So, the firms total cost function can be 
written as ܶܥ௜ = ௜݂(ݓ,ݒ, ݐ, ݎ) ௜ܺ.The marginal cost (MC) can be expressed as ௜݂(ݓ, ݒ, ݐ, ݎ).  As 
firms increase output we can assume that eventually scarcities will occur and the marginal cost 
of production will rise.  This can occur because of the rising cost of labor per unit of output 
produced and/or because of capital costs per unit is rising.  Eventually, there reaches a point at 
which equilibrium occurs in firms.  This profit maximization point ( ௜ܺ∗) will represent the point 
at which  ܯܴ௜ = ܯܥ௜ , also expressed as ௜ܲ = ௜݂(ݓ, ݒ, ݐ, ݎ).   
             One of the goals of foreign aid (ܽ௜) is to improve conditions for private sector businesses 
in developing countries. There are many ways in which this can occur.  Foreign aid can increase 
education and training of workers, which would lower the firms labor cost per unit produced.  
So,  the wage cost per unit produced can be expressed as a negative function of foreign aid, 
ݓ௜(ܽ௜).  Aid may also be used to subsidize equipment/technology purchases for firms or come in 
the form of credit extensions which may be used for capital purchases.  Therefore, we can write 
the cost of capital as a negative function of foreign aid, ݒ௜(ܽ௜) .  It is common for both 
multilateral and bilateral aid to be used for infrastructure projects (roads, harbors, airports, etc).  
These would lower the transportation costs for firms resulting in the following function where 
transportation costs are a negative function of foreign aid, ݐ௜(ܽ௜).  The flow of foreign aid into a 
sector may have a negative side effect; however, by increasing the rent seeking behavior of 
government officials since more funds flowing into a sector may result in corrupt officials 
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seeking higher payout from firms.  Therefore, the costs imposed by rent seeking officials is 
modeled as a positive function of aid, ݎ௜(ܽ௜). With foreign aid included in the model we can 
rewrite the equilibrium condition as ௜ܲ = ௜݂[ݓ௜(ܽ௜),ݒ௜(ܽ௜), ݐ௜(ܽ௜)ݎ௜(ܽ௜)]  .  
               We can now examine the impact on the equilibrium condition from a change in foreign 
aid.  We will assume that foreign aid does not impact output prices, especially for the export 
driven sector. Therefore, the differentiation of this condition with respect to foreign aid is only a 
differentiation of the marginal cost function.  This can be expressed as 
(11.)                                   ࣔࢌ࢏
ࣔࢇ࢏
= ࣔࢌ࢏
ࣔ࢝࢏
ࣔ࢝࢏
ࣔࢇ࢏
+ ࣔࢌ࢏
ࣔ࢜࢏
ࣔ࢜࢏
ࣔࢇ࢏
+ ࣔࢌ࢏
࢚ࣔ࢏
࢚ࣔ࢏
ࣔࢇ࢏
+ ࣔࢌ࢏
ࣔ࢘࢏
ࣔ࢘࢏
ࣔࢇ࢏
    
first expression on the right hand side ( ப୤౟
ப୵౟
ப୵౟
பୟ౟
≤ 0) represents foreign aid potentially lowering 
the cost of labor.  They potentially lower cost of capital from aid is represented as   డ௙೔
డ௩೔
డ௩೔
డ௔೔
≤ 0.  
The potential reduction in transport costs   is shown as     డ௙೔
డ௧೔
డ௧೔
డ௔೔
≤ 0.   The possible   rise in rent 
seeking costs is the last term on the right hand side which is    ப୤౟
ப୰౟
ப୰౟
பୟ౟
≥ 0. Therefore, the overall 
impact of foreign aid is combining three potential cost reduction factors (w, v, and t) with one 
potential cost increase (r).  Whether or not the overall sign of   డ௙೔
డ௔೔
    is greater or less than zero 
will depend to a large extent on the quality of a country’s institutions and on how the foreign aid 
is directed.  If aid is directed towards more productive uses that lower firm' labor, capital and/or 
transport costs then this will help turn the prediction towards lower marginal costs.  If marginal 
costs of production fall for firms as a result of foreign aid then output in the sector will increase. 
In other words, if   ப୤౟
பୟ౟
< 0  then  பଡ଼౟ பୟ౟ > 0. We do not use the gravity trade model because aid is 
typically between the rich and least developed nations however we use a partial log equation to 
depict the effect that aid can have on trade in developing countries. Therefore our model asserts 
that exports will depend on a set of exogenous variables ௜ܺ,௧  and aid. Our set of exogenous 
variables consists of a set of variables that affect trade. The model we present is the trade model 
below in equation 12. We extend the model to sectors and relate the effect of aid to sectors to 
total trade in a country to determine the effect that aid to each sector has on trade.  
 
(12.) ࡱ࢞࢖࢕࢚࢙࢘࢏,࢚ = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛࡭࢏ࢊ࢏,࢚ + ࢿ࢏,࢚ 
We expect our above model, to yield the following hypotheses which will be tested in this paper 
for the export sector  
Hypothesis #1.) Aid focused directly on export promotion (extensions of trade credit, etc) will 
have a positive impact on exports.  
Hypothesis #2.) The positive impact of aid on exports will be reduced if the country has lower 
institutional quality     (more corruption). 
 
Hypothesis #3.) Aid focused on infrastructure investments will increase exports.   
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 Hypothesis #4.) Due to conditionality, it is expected that multilateral aid will suffer from less 
rent seeking and will be directed more towards lowering firms’ costs as opposed to bilateral aid.  
Therefore, the positive impact of aid on exports should be higher for multilateral aid rather than 
bilateral aid. 
 
 Hypothesis #5.) Aid directed towards the agricultural and educational sector may or may not 
increase exports depending on whether the aid is promoting production for export or for 
domestic consumption.  
 
 
3.0 Data and Sources   
The descriptive statistics of all data used, is presented below (see Table 1). We use panel data in 
our study. We obtain data for five African countries, four in sub Saharan Africa and one in North 
Africa (i.e. Kenya, Botswana, Ghana, Cameroon and Egypt) for a period of 39 years 1970 to 
2008 although some data are missing. 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is exports, we use exports as our measure of trade, it is the total amount 
of goods and services exported overseas from a given country in constant US dollars, it however 
does not capture domestic trade which is a major limitation. Data for exports is obtained from 
World Bank database. Logarithm of exports is taken because the data on exports is too noisy 
therefore this helps to resolve scaling issues. Exports overseas depicts the exporting country’s 
capacity to exports and its share of oversea trade which is often its foreign exchange earning 
capacity, therefore export is a vital measure of a country’s international trade.   
Description of explanatory variables 
 Data for aid, gross domestic product (GDP), Population, exchange rate, trade openness, 
government spending and inflation was also obtained from World Bank database. Two different 
measure of aid is used in this paper. One is effective aid (pure aid) which consist of grants and 
grants component of loans, initially constructed by Chang, Fernandez- Arias, and Serven (1999) 
and the other is official aid which we described as distorted and conditional in nature (distorted 
because donors often require recipient to use a sizable amount to import goods from donor 
countries) it also consists of grants and loans whose grants component is at least 25% according  
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Table-1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations        Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Log of exports 195 3.25 0.48 1.21 4.32 
Log of GDP/capita 194 13.35 0.84 11.87 15.79 
Natural Resources 195 0.6 0.49 0 3 
Exchange Rate  195 1.15 1.92 0.0004 7.03 
Landlocked Status 195 1.8 0.4 1 2 
Economic Policy 190 -1.25 1.09 -1.80 5.22 
Institutional Quality 140 -1.67 1.24 -1.83 1.83 
Crude price 195 42.72 21.48 15.93 99.11 
Life Expectancy 195 55.04 5.11 44.63 68.41 
Health Access 140 73.33 22.62 5 99 
Inflation 190 15.05 17.4 -3.21 122.88 
Openness 195 70.24 30.56 22.25 157.63 
Torture 140 0.59 0.61 0 2 
Electoral Self Determination 140 0.99 0.73 0 2 
Freedom of movement 140 1.01 0.82 0 2 
Political Imprisonment 140 0.87 0.83 0 2 
Effective Bilateral Aid 105 2.98 2.43 0.42 15 
Effective Multilateral  Aid 105 1.41 1.37 0.11 6.4 
Total Effective Aid 105 4.39 2.98 0.77 16 
Official Multilateral Aid 195 1.62 1.64 0.03 8.28 
Total Official Aid 195 5.75 3.91 0.17 18.24 
Log of Official aid to Education 144 -6.34 1.74 -14.81 -2.99 
Log of Official aid to Agriculture 145 -6.1 1.77 -10.68 -3.46 
Log of Official Aid to Infrastructure  145 -4.76 1.3 -10.08 -2.19 
Log of Official Aid to Trade Policy 130 -6.96 1.89 -13.28 -3.23 
Log of Official aid to industry 144 -6.84 1.85 -13.41 -3.04 
School enrollment rate 183 88.94 15.64 55.15 120 
Life Expectancy in Years 195 55.04 5.11 2 68.4 
Source: Authors compilation (from WDI dataset of the World Bank and other sources) 
to World Bank data. This allows us to determine the difference in their respective impact on 
trade. Bilateral and multilateral aid is added up to obtain what we call total effective aid and total 
official aid respectively. Effective aid data was available only for a period of 1975 to 1985 and 
official aid data for the period of 1970 to 2008.  We intend to compare the difference of the 
impact of effective aid from that of official aid on trade and note the difference between aid 
without conditionality (effective aid) and aid with conditionality (official aid) on trade since 
donor often require recipient to purchase goods from donor countries as a condition for giving 
official aid, this could make official aid to be too stringent thereby limiting its impact on trade.  
Effective aid to sectors was not available for individual sectors, comparing the difference in total 
aid allocation allows us to know the difference of the impact of official aid from effective aid on 
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trade, so as draw conclusion of their impact on trade. Official aid to sectors alone was used to 
determine the impact of aid to sectors on trade this will probably affect our results since we lack 
data on effective aid to sectors. Data on official aid to sectors was obtained from The College of 
William and Mary Williamsburg Virginia aid data base www.aiddata.org , for the period of 1980 
to 2008 (29 years) for five the sectors that we wish to consider their effect on trade, although 
some years of data are missing. The sectors are trade and business support services, 
infrastructure, education agriculture and industry. Country specific income was represented as 
GDP per capita which is the average per capita income of individuals in a country, exchange rate 
is the average dollar local currency exchange rate by country this captures fluctuation in the 
global economy that are likely to affect trade since the dollar is the global currency used in 
international trade. Economic liberalization rate was captured using the number of phone lines, 
since businesses are likely to acquire more phone lines in a liberalized economy than in a highly 
regulated one. We use indices to capture the effect of economic policy and institutional quality 
on trade in the presence of aid. This method of construction of the indices is shown in next 
section. Economic policy is the fluctuations in government regulatory decisions reflected in its 
monetary and trade policies. We capture this using inflation and trade openness variables and 
develop a single index for this using principal component analysis (PCA). Investors are likely to 
consider how sound and consistent government economic policy have been overtime in the cause 
o their future investment in the private sector of an economy. While institutional quality is 
reflective of government attitude and behavior towards governance. We capture these using 
political variables. Institutions will also capture a whole host of factors such as transaction cost 
involved in running businesses, the cost and time in acquiring business permits and the quality of 
infrastructure which will affect the cost of transportation to both local and foreign markets, since 
access roads linking rural agricultural areas to ports will depend on governments ability to create 
enabling environment for trade. We obtain data on institutions from Brigham University political 
data, we create an index also for institutions (see next section for index construction). Foreign 
direct investment is the inflow of foreign investment to the private business sector in a country in 
constant US dollars, school enrollment was used to capture the level of skill available in the 
labor market, this was the total school  enrollment of boys and girls between the ages of 0 to 15 
years of age, therefore we expect that this will affect the overall quality of manpower in 
countries which could have an effect on output productivity, all variables are for a period of 1970 
to 2008 except otherwise stated.  
 
4.0 Some Constraints to Trade in Africa: Constructing economic and institutional indices 
Business surveys such as World business environment (WBE) report and World development 
reports (WBR) of the World Bank of 1999/2000 and 1996/1997 respectively have listed some 
constraints to foreign direct investment and trade in Africa (See Table 2). They used a sample of 
413 and 540 firms respectively in Africa in the two surveys, and respondents were asked to 
determine on a four point scale (1= no constraint and 4 = severe constraint) for the first survey 
and six point scale (1= no constraint and 6 = severe constraint) for the second, to depict 
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             Table-2 Constraints on Trade in Africa 
WBE(1= no constraint  WBR(1= no constraint  
4= severe constraint)  6= severe constraint)  
    
Corruption  2.80 Taxes and Regulation 4.50 
Weak Infrastructure 2.75 Corruption 4.47 
Street Crime  2.70 Weak Infrastructure 4.28 
Inflation 2.67 Crime  4.25 
Financing 2.64 Inflation 4.11 
Organized Crime 2.57 Lack of Access to Finance 3.95 
Political Instability 2.43 Policy Uncertainty 3.88 
Taxes and Regulation 2.24 Cost Uncertainty 3.75 
Exchange Rate 2.15 Regulation of Foreign Trade 3.64 
                    
                   Source: World Bank Business Report (2000), also used by Asiedu (2002) 
                 Note: The table above shows the different constraints on trade in Africa using results from two World Bank surveys 
 
 
the extent to which some factors constrained business operation in African countries for each of 
the reports. As can be seen above in Table 2, institutional and economic factors rank highest on 
the list of constraints to business and trade in Africa. Corruption, weak infrastructure and crime 
are the greatest institutional impediments to trade while inflation and financing are strong 
economic impediments to trade. Therefore having a good measure for institutional quality and 
economic policy as they affect trade is vital in determining the dynamics that affect trade in 
Africa. In this paper we group most of these constraints into institutional and economic factors 
and reduce the number of variables by creating an index which captures their effect.           
             Developing a single variable from a list of variables that have been identified to be 
relevant to our topic under study (trade) makes the discussion of what the effect of institution or 
policy is on trade to be easier. Most variables used to capture institutional quality are often 
political indicators, they show the direction of a country’s internal governing style and are often 
used to rate the reputation of its government and its inclination to good governance through its 
affinity for democratic values. Principal component analysis (PCA) allows us to create a single 
index for economic policy and institutional quality, this is a statistical technique used, to derive 
summary measures from a set of variables by capturing their variation. The difficulty most 
economists face when considering institutions is that they find numerous indicators for 
institutions and it becomes difficult to analyze institutions using every single one of them. The 
variables we use to capture institutional quality are country specific freedom of movement and 
electoral self determination rate. These variables depict a country’s respect for rights to social 
assembly and right to self electoral determination. The reason for using these two variables is 
that it allows us to capture country specific freedom of association since this could affect trade if 
people are prohibited from doing business because of their opposition to government or 
unnecessary threats to life and property. While electoral self determination rate allows us to 
capture political stability and the presence of enabling environment that can promote trade.      
            Governments also find it difficult to control many economic indicators, however some of 
the economic policies that governments float are captured using indicators that governments try 
to control, and some examples of such policies are its monetary, trade and fiscal policies. To 
capture these three policies economist use indicators such as inflation, trade openness and 
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government spending or budget surplus to measure the effect of these policies on growth. The 
difficulty arising from using such indicators is that if one wants to talk about economic policy as 
an entity it also becomes virtually impossible or quite cumbersome using more than one indicator 
to discuss the effect of government economic policy on the issue under focus. Due to this 
difficulty we use these three indicators (inflation, trade openness and government consumption 
spending) to develop a single index for economic policy. In this paper we show the index 
construction below. We create the index for institutional quality using the two variables stated 
above. They are freedom of movement (freedmove), which is the right to social association and 
electoral self determination rate (elecsd) which captures political stability as stated earlier. We 
obtain these variables from Brigham university data set for political indicators developed by 
international non-governmental organizations.   
 
              Freedom of association was developed by assigning a score of 0 in cases where it did 
not exist, 1 in situations where it was interfered with and 2 in cases where it was present. 
Electoral self determination rate was measured by assigning a score of 0 in cases where it did not 
exist, 1 in a case where it existed but there were some limitations and 2 in a case where citizens 
have ability to exercise full political and voting rights. Principal component analysis uses a 
weighted average of the underlying variables above to develop an index for institutional quality 
using the matrix of eigenvectors transformation allowing us to obtain an uncorrelated index from 
a group of correlated variables. The result of our scatter matrix plot using the two variables used 
for generating institutional quality is presented below in fig 1. Where the variables 1 and 2 are 
freedom of movement and electoral self determination rate respectively. The scatter matrix 
shown below show that electoral self determination and freedom of movement are identically 
distributed (see blue dots) and closely correlated. This might not be clear but a case where 
variables are not correlated will be explained when developing the economic policy index 
subsequently.  
 
Fig.1 Above shows matrix plot the institutional variable 
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Table 3 Construction of institutional quality index using eigenvectors 
 
Method of construction 
(1) 
PCA 
(2) 
PCA 
 
Variables Component 1 Component 2  
 
Electoral self Determination Rate 
 
0.7071 
 
0.7071 
 
Freedom of movement 07071 -0.7071  
   Note: The above values are generated using eigenvalue transformation. We used the PCA command “pca elecsd freedmove”to  
   construct the institutional quality index in Table 3 above. The index captures the variation in the two variables allowing us to  
   generate a single index by adding the individual principal component of the variables. This index obtained using PCA is                                      
   uncorrelated with the dependent variable in our regression analysis. 
 
 
The results of the eigenvectors values is obtained in Table-1 above, (we show by hand below 
how this is constructed although “Stata” does it automatically) using the PCA command “pca 
elecsd freedmove”. The index is obtained by adding the two principal components obtained from 
the eigenvalue transformation using the two variables alternately as shown below. 
PC1= (0.7071* elecsd) + (0.7071* freedmove) and PC2= (0.7071* elecsd) - (0.7071* 
freedmove) where freedmove = freedom of movement and elecsd = electoral self determination 
rate. Institutional quality index is given by     Institutional quality = PC1+PC2  Where PC1 and 
PC2 are principal components 1 and 2 obtained from our variables.The score plot is shown 
below in figure 2 for the two components to depict the variation in our new index, it shows that 
there exist sufficient variations among our variables to capture the effect of institutions. 
 
Fig.2 Above show the score plots for the institutional variable 
 
           An index for economic policy was also created using the three variables inflation, trade 
openness and government consumption spending which captures government monetary, trade 
and fiscal policies respectively. Inflation is the change in price of goods over time in US dollars, 
trade openness is the ratio of exports to imports by country and government consumption 
spending is government welfare spending in US dollars, which displays its fiscal discipline. The 
scatter matrix plot for the variables used in the construction of economic policy is shown below 
below in figure 3. The results of our scatter plot show that government consumption spending is 
not correlated with inflation but only openness (see comparison of the narrow blue scatter on the 
left with openness and inflation). We find that inflation and openness have a stronger correlation 
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with each other. Using a set of uncorrelated variables could affect the quality of our index since 
it could either reduce the variation of the index or over exaggerate its variation making the index 
to have a strong negative or strong positive effect leading to poor conclusions as to the effect of 
the index in our study. Government consumption spending was dropped to avoid such problems 
and we used only inflation and trade openness in our index construction. Past literature e.g. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly (2003) also lend credence to our assertion since they 
state that countries can experience growth or trade increase with poor fiscal conditions (i.e. 
growing budget deficit) as most developed countries have for decades. 
 
Fig3 Above show the matrix plot for the economic policy variable 
 
The PCA command used to produce the eigenvectors in Table-4 is “pca openness inflation”  
 
  Table 4 Construction of Economic policy index using eigenvectors 
 
Method of construction 
(1) 
PCA 
(2) 
PCA 
 
Variables Component 1 Component 2  
 
Openness  
 
0.7071 
 
0.7071 
 
Inflation  07071 -0.7071  
    Note: The above values are generated using eigenvalue transformation. Using the PCA below we also show we construct the  
      economic policy index from our matrix of eigenvectors as follows using the command “pca openness inflation” in the table  
     above. 
 
 
Economic policy index is generated from our principal component eigenvector table shown in 
Table-4 above as PC1= (0.7071*openness) + (0.7071*inflation) and PC2= (0.7071*openness)-
(0.7071*inflation) Economic policy index is also obtained from summation of the principal 
components shown below as Economic policy index = PC1+PC2 where PC1 and PC2 are our 
principal component, 1 and 2 respectively. The results of the score plots also shows the 
correlation between openness and inflation in figure 4 whereas figure 5 shows all three variables, 
in figure 5 we observe that government consumption spending affects  
inflation
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Fig4                                                                                    Fig5 
 
Note: Fig 4 and 5 show the score plots for the policy variable 
 
the spread of our score plots in such a manner as to skew our spread more in the positive 
direction (compare the spread on the vertical axis of both figures). This gives some more 
leverage as to why it was dropped. See Abeyasekera (2004) and Schlens (2009) for further 
discussion on how PCA produce consistent indices. 
 
5.0 Empirical Analysis 
 
Does Aid Attract Trade? 
         Our empirical model tries to answer, if aid promotes trade?  The argument we present is 
that many middle income countries receive higher amounts of aid than low income countries (see 
USAID 2010 fast facts), this can be attributed to the fact that there is a higher volume of trade 
between middle income countries and developed countries who give aid. Based on this one 
might be tempted to say absolutely that it is trade alone that attracts aid. When one considers 
cases like that of Rwanda or Kenya that are particularly poor countries with little or no mineral 
resources and a low volume of trade but receive aid, we can state otherwise  since there exists 
little or no incentive of giving aid to such countries. One can argue from sound judgment based 
on reasons for giving aid, that aid is initially altruistic to poor developing countries. Past studies 
e.g. Easterly (2003) suggest that giving aid to a country can establish a close connection between 
two countries leading donor country, to search for the presence of minerals and other country 
specific endowments in recipient country, on finding a sizeable deposit of resource this could 
lead to trade between both countries giving leverage to the argument that aid could be initially 
altruistic in nature, causing aid to attract trade.  
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Model specification 
           Hausman specification test was run to choose between using fixed and random effects 
model for estimation.  Results accept the null hypothesis that the fixed effects estimator is not 
biased (p-values are all considerably lower than .01). The use of instrumental variables approach 
is because of the endogeneity of the aid variables. A Hausman-Wu test rejected the null 
hypothesis that aid was exogenous, with a p-value of 0.00.  Therefore, using aid as an 
independent variable could lead to biased results. We then used fixed effect method of estimation 
to estimate our equations. We present the reduced forms of our three versions of aid and trade 
equations below (for effective, official and aid to sectors). 
 
The EDA versions of these equations are    
(13a) ࡱࡰ࡭࢏,࢚ = ࢻ૙ + ࢻ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢻ૛ࡵ࢏,࢚ + ܋ܑ + μ࢏,࢚ 
(13b) ࡱ࢞࢖࢕࢚࢙࢘࢏,࢚ = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛ࡱࡰ࡭෣ ࢏,࢚ + ܋ܑ + μ࢏,࢚ 
The ODA versions of these equations are 
(14a) ࡻࡰ࡭࢏,࢚ = ࢻ૙ + ࢻ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢻ૛ࡵ࢏,࢚ + ܋ܑ + μ࢏,࢚ 
(14b) ࡱ࢞࢖࢕࢚࢙࢘࢏,࢚ = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛ࡻࡰ࡭෣ ࢏,࢚ + ܋ܑ + μ࢏,࢚ 
The sectoral versions of these equations are 
(15a) ࡭ࡵࡰ࢏,࢚࢐ = ࢻ૙ + ࢻ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢻ૛ࡵ࢏,࢚ + ܋ܑ + μ࢏,࢚ 
(15b) ࡱ࢞࢖࢕࢚࢙࢘࢏,࢚ = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛࡭ࡵࡰଙ,࢚ଚ +෣ ࢉ࢏ + μ࢏,࢚ 
          The trade (exports) equations are linear specifications, where i is the index for the 
countries, t the index for time and trade is the logarithm of per capita export resulting from trade 
with other countries, aid (be it EDA,ODA and aid to sectors) is expressed as the logarithm of 
aggregate aid allocated for purposes that can stimulate trade. Our vector of exogenous variables 
௜ܺ,௧  consists of a group of specific variables that affect trade they consist of government 
economic policy, average dollar-local currency exchange rates which capture global shocks that 
affect trade, institutional quality, school enrollment rate and GDP per capita.  We excluded 
natural resources as a variable since we experience negative R-squared with its presence but use 
it in interacting aid.  We assume that aid is endogenous in the trade equations, since aid is likely 
to suffer from measurement problems. Therefore we employ an instrument ܫ௜,௧  for aid to capture 
the effect of aid in our aid equation. The dynamics that govern the different types of aid in 
promoting trade was found to be complex and different from one another. We find that with 
some types of aid, trade was found to depend on additional factors, since aid was to be used in 
promotion of trade, for instance with effective and official aid we found that such aid will likely 
be given to assist trade in the presence of reasonable foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
economic liberalization. With aid to sectors which was in fact official aid to sectors, aid will 
depend on some level of economic liberalization which allows for private ownership and some 
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investment in the private sector but not necessarily foreign direct investment. Where c୧  
represents time invariant unobserved effects on trade and µ୧୲  represents time varying unobserved 
effects on trade. The fixed effect method will produce consistent estimate of the effect of aid on 
trade by allowing arbitrary correlation between unobserved time invariant effects (c୧ ) and 
explanatory variables in the trade equations. The consistency of the FE estimators will depend on 
following assumption (a.) The time varying unobserved effects µ୧୲ are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables across all time periods.  (b.) There is significant variation in aid flow over 
time and (c.) The assumption of strict exogeneity of explanatory variables is fulfilled. The 
assumption of strict exogeneity is going rules out feedback effects from aid to trade and country 
specific effects over time. 
            In some other instance we estimate variants of the trade (exports) equation using GLS 
including the variable “interact” the interaction between aid and policy, aid and institutional 
quality and aid and natural resources using interaction variables. The predicted value for the 
instrumented variable (sectoral aid) was then interacted with the institutional quality, economic 
policy or natural resources.  The second equation (with exports as the dependent variable) then 
included the predicted aid variable, one of the interaction variables and the other explanatory 
variables used in all regressions. 
 
The interaction versions of these equations are 
(16a) ࡭ࡵࡰ࢏,࢚࢐ = ࢻ૙ + ࢻ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢻ૛ࡵ࢏,࢚ + ࢜࢏ + ࢿ࢏,࢚ 
(16b) ࡱ࢞࢖࢕࢚࢙࢘࢏,࢚ = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛࡭ࡵࡰଙ,࢚ଚ෣ + ࢼ૜࢏࢔࢚ࢋ࢘ࢇࢉ࢚࢏,࢚ + ࢜࢏ + ࢿ࢏,࢚ 
        In all government economic policy and income were lagged by one period. We have a total 
of two right hand side endogenous variables (logarithm of trade and aggregate aid) and at least 6 
excluded exogenous variables (logarithm of income, government economic policy, and 
institutional quality, exchange rates, market access, foreign direct investment, economic 
liberalization rate and school enrollment rate) with three interaction variables (aid interacts with 
economic policy, institutional quality and natural resources).     
 
Instrument 
           Exclusion restriction assumptions are typically theoretical an instrument that is valid 
should therefore be correlated with aid in our model specification but not with trade (exports). 
One of the most important aspects of the instrumental variable approach is having a variable (or 
variables) in the aid equation which is not included in the trade (export) equation; these variables 
are referred to as the “instruments”. We expect that our instruments should fulfill certain 
conditions in our case which will be particular for exports.  First, instruments should have a 
significant impact on the variable they are predicting, in this case the aid variable.  The second 
condition is that the instrument should not have an impact on the dependent variable, exports in 
the second equation.  While often this is tested empirically, Wooldridge (2010) and others have 
pointed out that this also needs to be done on the theoretical level as testing the impact of the 
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instrument on the dependent variable in the second equation (exports) with a full model could be 
biased as the instrumental correction has not been made for the endogenous variable (aid).  We 
use one instrument “life expectancy” for aid (i.e. for bilateral, multilateral and aid to sectors for 
the three sets of equations), so our model is exactly identified, we expect aid to flow to areas 
with low  life expectancy, making life expectancy to be positively correlated with aid. Our 
exclusion restriction will hold since it is reasonable to state that on the long run low life 
expectancy will attract foreign aid but will not promote exports allowing us to solve our first 
stage and second stage equations simultaneously.  
            The exclusion restriction we impose on our trade equation is that life expectancy is 
correlated with aid but not with trade, this will hold econometrically, if the coefficient for aid in 
our structural equation after imposing the restriction in our trade equation (where we use life 
expectancy as a proxy for aid) tends to that in our reduced form equation and secondly, if the 
correlation between the instrument ܫ௜,௧ and the error term ߝ௜,௧  is identically equal to zero as 
shown below in equation 17.  
(17)  E|ࡵ࢏,࢚ .࢛࢏|=0 and E|ࡵ࢏,࢚ .ࣕ࢏|=0 
This then shows that the only way life expectancy is related with trade is only through aid 
therefore the instruments ܫ௜,௧  is not correlated with the disturbances ( ݑ௜ and  ߳௜ ) in our model 
specification and finally, if the exogenous component of the instrument, (the fitted value of aid) 
is uncorrelated with the error term we can therefore identify the variation of the dependent 
variable trade (exports) as the slope of the aid coefficient.  This shows that there is sufficient 
variation (which is non zero) between aid and our instrument which we represent in the 
covariance (cov) equation 18 below. 
(18) Cov (࡭࢏ࢊ࢏,࢚ . ࡵ࢏,࢚) ≠ 0  
(where Aid can be EDA or ODA, this means that ߙଶ in not zero). This implies that exports will 
vary according to changes in aid in flow to countries (see Kraay (2008) for further discussion on 
exclusion restriction). We argue that our instrument meet the criteria theoretically for our 
exclusion restriction to hold, since the behavior of the instrument life expectancy (see the first 
stage results and F-tests in Tables 5 to 7), support previous literature e.g. Heintz (2004) that 
argue that a good instrument should capture the variation in the dependent variable and be highly 
correlated with the endogenous variable therefore ߚଶ (our aid coefficient) will no longer biased 
in our model specification. 
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Table 5. First Stage: EDA Regressions 
 Method of Estimation 
 
       OLS  
Bilateral EDA   
OLS 
Multilateral EDA   
OLS 
Total EDA 
Life Expectancy 0.36 0.35 0.71 
(.12)*** (.11)*** (.20)*** 
Policy Index -0.06 -0.21 -0.30 
(.12) (.15) (.23) 
Institution Index -0.0004 -0.31 -0.04 
(0.35) (0.17) (0.34) 
Exchange Rate (LCU per $) 0.27 0.23 0.49 
(.26) (.11)** (.30) 
FDI -0.06 -0.06 -3.08 
(.89) (.06) (.10)** 
School Enrollment Rate 0.01 -0.12 -0.11 
(.07) (.03) (.08) 
Liberation Policy   -0.42 0.97 1.38 
(.88) (.36)** (1.03) 
GDP per capita -2.67 -0.47 2.07 
(1.39)* (.66)*** (1.67) 
F-Test 8,23 10.13 12.90 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 73    73    73 
R-Squared 22    52    36  
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 6. First Stage: ODA Regressions 
 Method of Estimation 
 
       OLS  
Bilateral  EDA   
OLS 
Multilateral EDA   
OLS 
Total EDA 
Life Expectancy 0.28 0.16 0.44 
(.05)*** (.04)*** (.08)*** 
Policy Index -0.24 -0.35 -0.56 
(.15) (.15)** (.26)** 
Institution Index 0.24 -0.03 0.26 
(0.20) (0.16) (0.32) 
Exchange Rate (LCU per $) -0.42 0.22 -0.18 
(.31) (.13) (.40) 
FDI -0.08 0.03 3.10 
(.06) (.04) (.09) 
School Enrollment Rate 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 
(.03) (.02)*** (.04) 
Liberation Policy   -0.63 -0.13 -1.75 
(.12)*** (.07)* (1.58) 
GDP per capita -3.95 -0.56 4.47 
(.75)*** (.39) (1.02)*** 
F-Test 37.28 13.54 29.52 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 131   131    131 
R-Squared 0.53   0.34   0.48 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 7. First Stage:Sectoral Aid Regressions 
  
Aid to 
Trade   
Aid to 
Infrastructure   
Aid to 
Agriculture   
Aid to 
Education   
Life Expectancy 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.18 
(.08)*** (.04)*** (.04)*** (.05)*** 
Policy Index 0.27 -0.02 -0.02 -0.14 
(.24) (.15) (.17) (.32) 
Institution Index 0.21 0.04 0.37 0.39 
(.24) (.13)*** (.14)*** (.20)* 
Exchange Rate (LCU per $) -0.05 -0.01 0.30 -0.23 
(.33) (.13) (.33) (.25) 
School enrollment -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.04 
(.02) (.01)*** (.02) (.02)* 
Liberalization policy 
 
-0.11 -0.09 0.12 -0.17 
(.12) (.08)** (.08) (.09)** 
GDP per capita -0.78 -1.25 -0.03 -2.40 
(.52) (.42)*** (.57) (.57)*** 
F-Test 7.95 18.72 10.25 14.24 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observation  132    140    140   139 
R-Squared  0.21    0.43    0.28   0.25 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to  
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
     
 
Results 
           We use fixed effect regression as stated earlier, since the result of the Hausman test with 
p-value 0.0004 (we included this in our results only for aid to sectors results) suggest that fixed 
effect estimation is more appropriate for our model, see Baltagi (2005), Baltagi and Wu (2010) 
and Wooldridge (2010) for further discussion. We find that the factors that affect effective aid 
are quite different from those of official aid since effective aid is pure aid devoid of 
conditionality.  Time effect “year” is included to control for differences in exports from countries 
in years. This allows us to control, for production shocks and fluctuations in global demands for 
exports that is likely to affect volumes of exports. We present our result for effective aid and 
                                                             
4  This did not hold in some cases with effective and official aid 
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official aid below in Tables 8 to 11. We compare the results of the OLS estimates with those of 
the 2SLS. As expected the results of the standard errors of our 2SLS estimates are larger than 
those of our OLS estimates for aid see standard errors in Table 8 and 9 for our regressions of 
trade (using log of exports) on effective aid and other factors that affect trade. In Table 8 the 
OLS estimate for bilateral and multilateral effective aid are 0.06 and 0.10 respectively (see 
coefficients in table 8 Column 1 and 2) it shows that bilateral aid contributed 6 percentage points 
towards trade (with p-value 0.037) while multilateral aid contributed 10 percentage points to 
trade but had a stronger effect (with p-value 0.023) on trade. But the estimate is quite different 
when we use 2SLS in Table 9 the result of the F-test for excluded instruments for the 2SLS 
shows that the instrument life expectancy is valid and highly correlated with aid (see first stage 
regression results for effective aid). The estimated aid effect on trade is now 0.15 and 0.16 (see 
Table 9 Column 1 and 2) using 2SLS showing that multilateral aid contributed about 1 
percentage point more to trade (with p-value 0.03) compared to bilateral trade with only 15 
percent (with p-value 0.07) . This showed that controlling for endogeneity helps solve the 
problem of aid measurement, through the instrumental correction of aid since this could lead to 
bias in our results.  
               The results of the regression of trade on official aid are presented in tables 10 and 11. 
The result of the OLS regression with estimates for bilateral and multilateral official aid 
respectively of   0.06 and 0.05 in Table 10 Column 1 and 2, shows that bilateral aid contributed 6 
percentage points to trade (with p-value of 0.000), while multilateral aid contributed 5 
percentage points (with p-value of 0.052) to trade which is 1 percentage points less than bilateral 
aid contribution to trade. The results of our 2SLS estimates where we control for endogeneity are 
different from our OLS estimates. The result of the F-test for excluded instruments shows that 
our instrument life expectancy is valid and highly correlated with aid (see first stage official aid 
regression). The result in Table 11 Columns 1 and 2 shows that bilateral aid contributes 12 
percentage points to trade (with p-value 0.000) while multilateral aid contributes 21 percentage 
points to trade with ( p-value of 0.000) which is 9 percentage points more than bilateral aid 
contribution t trade. This result suggests once again that using 2SLS to address the issue of 
endogeneity is important, since aid is likely to suffer from measurement problems making the 
OLS results to be biased. Table 12 and 13 present the estimates of the regression of trade on aid 
to sectors and factors that affect trade in sectors. The result of our OLS estimates (see Table 12) 
show that aid to sectors had no effect on trade except for aid to infrastructure that contributed 10 
percentage points to trade (with p-value 0.000) while aid to trade policy and business support 
services, agriculture and education contributed 2,1 and 3 percentage points to trade respectively 
and had no significant effect on trade. The results of our 2SLS are different from that of the OLS 
estimates for aid to sectors. Aid had a significant effect in four sectors, With aid to trade and 
business support services, infrastructure, agriculture and education contributing 15, 22, 17 and 16 
percentage points respectively to trade using 2SLS (see Table 13 Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 for aid 
estimates of 0.15, 0.22, 0.17and 0.16 respectively) therefore controlling for endogeneity using 
2SLS was also relevant in this case. Aid to industry had no significant effect on trade so we left 
that out in our results. The result of our F- test show that our instrument is relevant and valid 
since it is highly correlated with aid (see first stage results using official aid to sectors).  Finally 
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GLS was used in estimating our trade equation with the interactive variables, the three 
interactive variables aid*economic policy, aid*institutions and aid*natural resources had reduced 
effect on trade showing that these variables reduce aid effectiveness (we show results in the 
Appendix-A to C in Tables 14 to 16).Based on the above results we answer the hypothesis that 
we posed earlier as follows 
 
Hypothesis #1.) Aid focused directly on export promotion (extensions of trade credit, etc) was 
found to be contributing to exporting in a significant manner. Therefore aid channeled to sectors 
that could improve output productivity is likely to be useful in promoting trade. 
 
 Hypothesis #2.) Institutions were probably contributing negatively to aid effectiveness in 
promoting exports. The interactive variable aid*institutions had a reduce effect on exporting. It is 
likely that institutions are weak and not helping in effective utilization of aid to promote trade. 
 
 Hypothesis #3.) Aid focused on infrastructure investments was found to be contributing to 
exports in a positive manner.  It is likely that aid used in developing infrastructure will likely 
create enabling environment that can promote trade by way of cost reduction in the trade 
facilitation process.  
 
 Hypothesis #4.) Multilateral aid was found to be contributing to exporting in a more significant 
manner than bilateral aid. It is likely that the altruistic nature and good policy requirement 
conditions associated with multilateral aid made it more effective in promoting trade than 
bilateral aid. 
 
Hypothesis #5.) Aid directed towards agriculture and education sector contributed to exporting 
significantly. It is likely that aid used in improving the level of education of the working 
population as well as modernizing methods used in cultivation was useful to improving trade. 
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Table 8. Impact of EDA on Exports 
     Method of Estimation 
 
OLS 
(1)    
OLS 
(2)   
OLS 
(3) 
Bilateral EDA 0.06 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(.03)** 
    
      Multilateral EDA - 
 
0.10 
 
- 
   
(.04)** 
  
      
Total EDA - 
 
- 
 
0.06 
(.02)*** 
      
      Policy Index 0.08 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 
(.05) 
 
(.05) 
 
(.05) 
      Institution Index 0.28 
 
0.30 
 
0.28 
 
(.06)*** 
 
(.06)*** 
 
(.06)*** 
      School enrollment 0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(.004)*** 
 
(.004)*** 
 
(.004)*** 
      Exchange rate (LCU per $) 0.08 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
 
(.04)* 
 
(.04)** 
 
(.04)** 
      Liberalization policy 0.09 
 
-0.29 
 
0.18 
 
(.10) 
 
(.12)** 
 
(.10)* 
   FDI 0.06 
 
0.06 
 
0.06 
 
(.02)*** 
 
(.02)** 
 
(.02)** 
      GDP per capita 0.15 
 
0.19 
 
0.22 
 
(.10) 
 
(.10)* 
 
(.10)** 
      Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 73   73    73  
R-Squared 0.72   0.73    0.73  
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 9. Impact of EDA on Exports 
     Method of Estimation 
 
2SLS 
(1)  
2SLS 
(2)   
2SLS 
(3) 
Bilateral EDA 0.15 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(.09)* 
    
      Multilateral EDA - 
 
0.16 
 
- 
   
(.07)** 
  
      
Total EDA - 
 
- 
 
0.08 
(.04)*** 
      
      Policy Index -0.11 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.10 
 
(.06)** 
 
(.05)* 
 
(.05)* 
      Institution Index 0.14 
 
0.15 
 
0.15 
 
(.06)** 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.05)*** 
      School enrollment -0.001 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
(.01) 
 
(.01)** 
 
(.01) 
      Exchange rate (LCU per $) 0.21 
 
0.21 
 
0.21 
 
(.11)** 
 
(.08)*** 
 
(.09)** 
      Liberalization policy -0.13 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.09 
 
(.17) 
 
(.10)** 
 
(.13)* 
   FDI 0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.001 
 
(.02)*** 
 
(.01)** 
 
(.01)** 
      GDP per capita 0.12 
 
0.61 
 
0.38 
 
(.45) 
 
(.18)*** 
 
(.27) 
      Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 73   73    73  
R-Squared 0.28   0.51    0.64 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 10. Impact of ODA on Exports 
     Method of Estimation 
 
OLS 
(1)    
OLS 
(2)   
OLS 
(3) 
Bilateral ODA 0.06 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(.02)*** 
    
      Multilateral ODA - 
 
0.05 
 
- 
   
(.02)* 
  
      
Total ODA - 
 
- 
 
0.04 
(.01)*** 
      
      Policy Index -0.10 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.10 
 
(.04) 
 
(.05) 
 
(.04) 
      Institution Index 0.23 
 
0.25 
 
0.23 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.04)*** 
      School enrollment 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
(.003)*** 
 
(.003)*** 
 
(.003)*** 
      Exchange rate (LCU per $) -0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02) 
      Liberalization policy 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02) 
   FDI 0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
(.02)* 
 
(.02)** 
 
(.02)* 
      GDP per capita 0.17 
 
0.12 
 
0.19 
 
(.06)*** 
 
(.06)** 
 
(.06)*** 
      Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 131   131    131  
R-Squared 0.64   0.61    0.64  
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 11. Impact of ODA on Exports 
     Method of Estimation 
 
2SLS 
(1)    
2SLS 
(2)   
2SLS 
(3) 
Bilateral ODA 0.12 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(.03)*** 
    
      Multilateral ODA - 
 
0.21 
 
- 
   
(.06)*** 
  
      
Total ODA - 
 
- 
 
0.07 
(.02)*** 
      
      Policy Index -0.05 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.04 
 
(.07) 
 
(.07) 
 
(.07) 
      Institution Index 0.14 
 
0.16 
 
0.15 
 
(.05)*** 
 
(.05)*** 
 
(.05)*** 
      School enrollment -0.001 
 
0.01 
 
0.04 
 
(.001) 
 
(.004)*** 
 
(.003) 
      Exchange rate (LCU per $) -0.02 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.06 
 
(.07) 
 
(.06)* 
 
(.06) 
      Liberalization policy 0.05 
 
-0.0002 
 
0.03 
 
(.02)** 
 
(.01) 
 
(.01)* 
   FDI 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(.01) 
 
(.01)* 
 
(.01)* 
      GDP per capita 0.10 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.02 
 
(.20) 
 
(.13)* 
 
(.16) 
      Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 131   131    131  
R-Squared 0.31   0.36   0.39  
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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         Table 12 Impact of Sectoral Aid on Exports 
Method of Estimation OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
      
     
Aid to trade 0.2 - - - 
 (.02)    
     
Aid to infrastructure - 0.10 - - 
  (.03)***   
     
Aid to agriculture - - 0.01 - 
   (.02)  
     
Aid to Education - - - 0.03 
    (.02) 
     
     
School Enrollment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** (.03)*** 
     
Exchange rate -0.02 -0.01 0.0002 -0.01 
 (.02)*** (.02) (.02) (.02) 
     
Economic policy 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 
 (.05)** (.04)** (.05)** (.04)** 
     
Institutional quality 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.27 
 (.03)*** (.03)*** (.04)*** (.04)*** 
     
Liberalization Policy  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (.20) (.20) (.20) (.20) 
     
GDP per capita 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.08 
 (.05) (.06)*** (.06) (.05) 
     
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00         0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 118 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.60 0.53 0.69 0.69 
           Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to    
           significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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            Table 13 Impact of Sectoral Aid on Exports 
Method of Estimation 2SLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
      
     
Aid to trade 0.15 - - - 
 (.06)**    
     
Aid to infrastructure - 0.22 - - 
  (.07)***   
     
Aid to agriculture - - 0.17 - 
   (.10)**  
     
Aid to Education - - - 0.16 
    (.06)** 
     
     
School Enrollment 0.01 0.02 -0.001 0.003 
 (.004) (.004) (.01)** (.01) 
     
Exchange rate  -0.12 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 
 (.06)* (.06) (.10) (.08) 
     
Economic policy -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 
 (.06)** (.06)** (.09)** (.09)** 
     
Institutional quality 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.12 
 (.06)** (.05)*** (.07) (.06)** 
     
Liberalization Policy  -0.01 0.004 0.01 0.02 
 (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
     
GDP per capita -0.38 -0.20 -0.41 -0.04 
 (.14)*** (.15) (.15)*** (.21) 
     
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00         0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 118 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.16 0.43 0.01 0.02 
           Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to    
           significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
          In this paper we investigated some questions raised during the course of this study. They 
are what component of aid is useful in promoting trade in developing countries? We found that 
aid to sectors was useful in promoting trade, with aid to trade policy, infrastructure, agriculture 
and education being significant in promoting trade. This is consistent with past findings by 
Morrissey et al (2004) and Velde and Cali (2009) who state that channeling aid to productive 
sectors in an economy could boost export oriented growth.  Aid to industry had no impact on 
trade so we neglected it in our results. It was likely that finished goods from developing 
countries do not compete favorably with goods from developed countries and technology is often 
a problem in developing countries making it difficult to produce.  Effective aid had contributed 
less to exports compared to official aid. However multilateral aid proved more useful promoting 
export than bilateral aid this is attributable to conditions associated with multilateral aid 
disbursements which make them more effective in promoting exporting. 
            We also investigated if economic policies and institutional quality improves or decreases 
aid effectiveness in promoting trade in Africa? We found that economic policy and the quality of 
institutions in Africa generally weakens the effectiveness of aid in promoting trade. The 
interactive variables “aid*government economic policy” “aid*institutional quality” and 
“aid*natural resources” had a reduced effect on trade. This is consistent with past findings such 
as Burnside and Dollar (2002) and (2004) which state that aid will be effective in the presence of 
good policies and other findings by Sachs and Warner (1995) and Ross (2001) that suggest the 
presence of natural resources and weak institutions can affect economic development in 
developing countries. The inclusion of natural resources in our model caused our model to suffer 
from misspecification resulting in negative R-squared so we exclude it and used its interaction 
with aid in our subsequent GLS regression. This interactive variable aid* natural resources 
exerted a reduced effect on trade across all sectors, reducing aid effectiveness across sectors. 
Therefore diversifying the economy in many African countries should therefore be a strong 
concern to governments. 
           The policy implications of our findings is that economic policy  has a significant effect on 
aid effectiveness in Africa, therefore donors should continue to emphasize the need for African 
countries to float sound and consistent economic policies. Such policies could be vital in shoring 
up investor’s confidence and ensure the effective use of aid to boost capacities that can improve 
trade and stimulate export oriented growth on the long run. Secondly channeling aid to sectors 
that are likely to improve export capacities in developing countries could likely improve the way 
that aid can be used to drive growth in an effective manner. Aid given to trade capacities will 
likely fulfill the short term intention of giving aid to developing countries since it is likely to 
contribute to export driven growth in many African countries allowing for a discontinuation of 
aid giving policies to promote growth.  Over reliance on natural resources continue to remain an 
impediment to the growth of other sectors in many African economies, promoting diversification 
is likely to help prevent shocks (due to price fluctuation in natural resources) in many African 
countries that rely on specific natural resources for income. The reliance on these natural 
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resources as a source of alternative revenue often prevents governments from implementing 
sound policies that could improve growth. Alternative revenue sources through for example a 
creation of effective taxation scheme can help create other sources of financing government 
activities thereby reducing overdependence on resource derived revenues. 
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        Appendix A. Table 14 Trade Regressions With Aid*Economic Policy Interaction 
Method of Estimation GLS 
(1) 
GLS 
(2) 
GLS 
(3) 
GLS 
(4) 
      
     
Aid to trade 0.19 - - - 
 (.07)***    
Aid to Trade*Policy 0.01 
(.01)** 
- - - 
  - - - 
Aid to infrastructure - 0.16   
  (.19)***   
Aid to Infrastruc.*policy - 0.01 - - 
  (0.01)**   
Aid to agriculture - - 0.37 - 
   (.13)***  
Aid to Agriculture*policy - - 0.02 - 
   (.01)**  
Aid to Education - - - 0.64 
    (.22)*** 
Aid to Education*policy - - - 0.01 
    (.01)** 
Aid to industry - - - - 
     
Aid to Industry*policy - - - - 
     
     
School Enrollment  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** 
     
Exchange rate 0.07 0.02 0.22 0.01 
 (.02)*** (.02) (0.14) (0.02) 
     
Institutional quality 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 
 (.04)*** (.04)*** (.04)*** (.04)*** 
     
Liberalization rate -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** 
     
GDP per capita 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 (.05) (.05)** (.05) (.05) 
     
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00         0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 131 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
          Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to  
          significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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        Appendix B. Table 15 Trade Regressions With Aid*Institutions Interaction 
Method of Estimation GLS 
(1) 
GLS 
(2) 
GLS 
(3) 
GLS 
(4) 
      
     
Aid to trade 0.22 - - - 
 (.07)***    
Aid to Trade*Institutions -0.04 
(.01)*** 
- - - 
   - - 
Aid to infrastructure - 0.84   
  (.28)***   
Aid to Infrastr.*Institutions - -0.06 - - 
  (0.01)***   
Aid to agriculture - - 0.40 - 
   (.13)***  
Aid to Agric*Institutions - - -0.04 - 
   (.01)***  
Aid to Education - - - 0.67 
    (.22)*** 
Aid to Educ*Institutions - - - -0.04 
    (.01)** 
Aid to industry - - - - 
     
Aid to Industry*Institutions - - - - 
     
     
School Enrollment  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** 
     
Exchange rate 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
     
Liberalization rate -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** 
     
GDP per capita 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 (.05) (.05)** (.05) (.05) 
     
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00         0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 131 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
         Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to              
         significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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        Appendix C. Table 16 Trade Regressions With Aid*Natural Resources Interaction 
Method of Estimation GLS 
(1) 
GLS 
(2) 
GLS 
(3) 
GLS 
(4) 
      
     
Aid to trade 0.22 - - - 
 (.10)***    
Aid to Trade*Resource 0.0004 
(.0004) 
- - - 
     
Aid to infrastructure - 0.89 - - 
  (.40)***   
Aid to Infrastr.* Resource - 0.0001 - - 
  (.001)   
Aid to agriculture - - 0.42 - 
   (.19)***  
Aid to Agric.* Resource - - 0.0004 - 
   (.0005)  
Aid to Education - - - 0.71 
    (.32)*** 
Aid to Educ.* Resource    0.0004 
 - - - (.0005)** 
Aid to industry     
     
Aid to Industry* Resource - - - - 
     
     
School Enrollment  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (.004)** (.004)** (.004)** (.004)** 
     
Exchange rate 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (.03)*** (.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
Institutional quality 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
 (.04)*** (.05)*** (.05)*** (.05)*** 
     
Liberalization rate -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** 
     
GDP per capita 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
 (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) 
     
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00         0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 131 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
         Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to     
         significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
 
